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I. INTRODUCTION
This August will be the fourth anniversary of my decision in Floyd v. City of 
New York.1 The good news is that since then the use of stop and frisk in New York 
has declined by more than ninety percent and there has been no increase in crime.2
Indeed, most categories of criminal activity in New York have decreased despite 
dire predictions to the contrary from the mayor, the police commissioner, and the 
corporation counsel of the City of New York at the time the decision was issued.3
,QGHHG RQH RI 1HZ<RUN¶V YHQHUDEOH WDEORLGV ZURWH DQ RSLQLRQ SLHFH ZLWK WKH
elegantly simple theme, stating³:H:HUH:URQJ(QGLQJ6WRSDQG)ULVN'LG1RW
(QG6WRSSLQJ&ULPH´4
President Donald J. Trump recently tweeted that if a terrorist attack occurs in 
the future, the judge who stayed his executive order banning certain groups of 
immigrants will be responsible.5 This was not entirely original.  Much the same 
ZDVVDLGE\1HZ<RUN¶VPD\RUDQGKLVFKLHIDGPLQLVWUDWRUVLQ6 A judge is 
only human.  While the responsibility for a spike in crime or a terrorist attack falls 
squarely at the feet of the bad actor(s), it is only natural that a judge worries about 
the consequences of his or her decision, even when he or she believes that the 

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1 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
2 See Ashley Southall, Shootings in New York Fall to Lowest Number Since the ‘90s, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04/nyregion/new-york-shootings-decline.
html [https://perma.cc/4HU2-LUD7]; Stop-and-Frisk Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://
www.nyclu.org/en/stop-and-frisk-data [https://perma.cc/VR3M-T3SF] (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
3 See Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/13/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-practice-violated-rights-
judge-rules.html [https://perma.cc/55KU-6FXL].
4 Editorial, We Were Wrong: Ending Stop and Frisk Did Not End Stopping Crime, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 8, 2016, 4:10 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/wrong-ending-stop-
frisk-not-stopping-crime-article-1.2740157 [https://perma.cc/A96X-A8ZG].
5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM), https://twitter.
com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800 [https://perma.cc/9VC7-V8G7].
6 See Goldstein, supra note 3.
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ruling is sound.  In short, the lack of any spike in criminal activity resulting from 
the decrease in stop and frisk has come as a welcome relief.
On the other hand, during the four years that have followed that ruling, there 
has been a new public awareness of police shootings.  Young black males have 
been grossly over-represented among the victims.  Many of those victims were 
wholly innocent and merely in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Other victims 
were engaged in the most minor criminal activity²such as shoplifting, selling 
untaxed cigarettes, or driving without a license²but ended up dead at the hands of 
the police.  I VD\ D ³QHZSXEOLF DZDUHQHVV´ EHFDXVH SROLFH YLROHQFH LV QRWQHZ
For decades, there have been close to 1,000 victims of police shootings every 
year.7 What has changed is the visibility of these shootings.  Now video cameras 
often record the event either from a camera mounted on a police vehicle, a camera 
ZRUQE\DSROLFHRIILFHURUDFHOOSKRQHRIWKHYLFWLP¶VFRPSDQLRQRURIDFLWL]HQ
observer in the vicinity of the event.  These real-time depictions of police 
encounters and the resulting deaths have shocked the nation and engendered a 
national discussion regarding racial profiling and police misconduct.  Indeed, many 
police departments are voluntarily adopting the use of dashboard and/or body 
cameras to provide a real-time record of police-citizen encounters.  It is in this 
context that I provide some reflections on the Floyd decision in light of the 
upcoming fiftieth anniversary of Terry v. Ohio.8
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, TERRY, AND POST-TERRY
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution staWHV³7KHULJKWRI
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
VHL]XUHVVKDOOQRWEHYLRODWHG´9 This first clause has come to be known as the 
Reasonableness Clause.10 A stop and frisk is a seizure, and possibly a search, and 
is surely governed by the Fourth Amendment.11 It is fair to say that a seizure 
RFFXUVZKHQDSHUVRQ¶VDELOLW\WRPRYHRQLVLPSHGHGE\SROLFHDFWLRQ12 A search 
RFFXUVZKHQWKHSROLFHLQYDGHDSHUVRQ¶VSULYDWHVSDFH13 Thus, from the earliest 
times, the elastic concept of what is reasonable has governed the ability of the state 
actor to make an investigatory stop and conduct a frisk.14

7 See, e.g., Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of 
Force Q1DW¶O%XUHDXRI(FRQ5HVHDUFK:RUNLQJ3DSHU1RKWWSZZZQEHURUJ
papers/w22399 [https://perma.cc/65QB-A47D].
8 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
10 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
11 Id. at 16.
12 Id. at 16±20.
13 Id.
14 Id.
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The modern phrase has become reasonable suspicion, although the word 
³VXVSLFLRQ´LVQRWIRXQGLQWKH)RXUWKAmendment.  In attempting to define what is 
reasonable, the Supreme Court stated in Terry that the reasonableness of the 
RIILFHU¶V FRQGXFW LQ PDNLQJ D VWRS ZRXOG EH MXGJHG E\ ³EDODQFLQJ WKH QHHG WR
search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [oUVHL]XUH@HQWDLOV´15 This, 
LQWXUQGHSHQGVRQZKHWKHUWKHSROLFHFDQ³SRLQWWRVSHFLILFDQGDUWLFXODEOHIDFWV
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
WKDW LQWUXVLRQ´16 With that standard in mind, the Court held that under the 
following circumstances the officer had the right to stop Terry and two others:
[T]wo men hover about a street corner for an extended period of time, at 
the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not waiting for 
anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical 
route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where 
each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference 
between the two men on the corner; where they are joined in one of these 
conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men 
finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away.17
On the same day that Terry was decided, the Court held that the stop 
described in Sibron v. New York18 was not based on reasonable suspicion.19 The 
Court described the facts as follows:
The officer . . . merely saw Sibron talking to a number of known 
narcotics addicts over a period of eight hours. . . . [The officer] was 
completely ignorant regarding the content of these conversations, and . . . 
saw nothing pass between Sibron and the addicts. . . . The inference that 
persons who talk to narcotics addicts are engaged in the criminal traffic 
in narcotics is simply not the sort of reasonable inference required to
VXSSRUW DQ LQWUXVLRQ E\ WKH SROLFH XSRQ DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V SHUVRQDO
security.20
In yet a third case that day, Peters v. New York,21 consolidated on appeal with 
Sibron, the Court found that because the officers had probable cause to arrest 
Peters²more than the reasonable suspicion needed to stop him²his stop passed 

15 Id. at 20±21 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
16 Id. at 21.
17 Id. at 23.
18 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
19 Id. at 63±64.
20 Id. at 62.
21 Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
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constitutional muster.22 This conclusion was based on the fact that the officer 
heard noises at his own door which led him to conclude that someone was seeking 
to forcibly enter his apartment.23 When he investigated, he saw two men, whom he 
had never before seen in his building where he had lived for twelve years, 
³WLSWRHLQJIXUWLYHO\DERXW WKHKDOOZD\´24 The officer then left his apartment and 
the men retreated by bolting down the stairs.25
In sum, theVH WKUHH RSLQLRQV VHW IRUWK WRGD\¶V VWDQGDUG RI MXGJLQJ WKH
constitutionality of a stop by whether there has been reasonable articulable 
suspicion of criminal activity.  The key point of these opinions is that officers in 
the field must make a quick judgment call as to whether what they observed 
supports a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and whether they can articulate 
the basis for their conclusion that they had such a reasonable suspicion.  Equally 
important is what those opinions do not say.  They do not provide much, if any, 
guidance for assessing reasonable suspicion.  This has left a significant gap that 
allows officers in the field tremendous discretion in exercising their judgment as to 
whether to make a stop, and then tasks judges with the difficult job of reviewing 
that exercise of discretion²all without an explicit legal framework of what 
suspicion is reasonable.  The very vagueness of the judicially-created standard is 
the likely culprit for the abuse of the practice of stop and frisk.
In the years following these decisions, the Court has applied the reasonable 
suspicion standard to many kinds of police activity, often expanding the concept to 
totally exclude the word reasonable, such as a protective sweep of a home when 
making an arrest,26 or the search of a car for weapons.27 Other examples include 
basing a stop on a barely corroborated anonymous tip,28 or conducting sobriety test 
roadblock stops in the absence of any particularized suspicion.29 In every instance, 
the officer has a great deal of discretion to determine when a suspicion is 
reasonable or when a practice is reasonable because its enforcement goals 
outweigh the intrusiveness of the stop.  These cases demonstrate that the Fourth 
$PHQGPHQW¶V SURWHFWLRQ DJDLQVW VHDUFK DQG VHL]XUH in the absence of probable 
cause has been emasculated by Terry and its progeny.  The data developed at the 
Floyd trial revealed that nearly 90% of the stops (which are seizures) resulted in no 
further law enforcement action²no summons, no arrests.30 Of the 52% of stopped 
persons who were frisked (which is a form of search), only 1.5% of frisks turned 





26 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
27 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
28 See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 326±27 (1990).
29 See 0LFK'HS¶WRI6WDWH3ROLFHY6LW]86
30 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558±59 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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up a weapon.31 It is likely there never was reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity supporting these stops, and whatever suspicion existed certainly was far 
from the probable cause standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment.
III. POLICE ACTIVITY AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION²
A PROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
Given the broad use of stop and frisk by police departments across the 
country, and the discretion left to officers and judges in defining reasonable 
suspicion, a number of questions arise that cry out for answers.  When does a 
hunch morph into a reasonable suspicion?  When is a decision to conduct a stop 
wrongly based on racial profiling?  How does implicit raciaOELDVDIIHFWDQRIILFHU¶V
exercise of discretion in his subjective evaluation of his observations?  What 
factors are legitimate for an officer to consider in deciding whether he has a 
sufficiently reasonable suspicion to make a stop?  These are some of the questions 
that pervaded the Floyd trial.
The UF-250 form utilized by the New York City Police Department 
³1<3'´ DSSOLHG D FKHFN-off-the-box approach for officers to indicate the 
circumstances that led them to make a stop.  The following categories were found 
on the front or back of the form: 




x actions indicative of acting as a lookout;
x suspicious bulge/object;
x actions indicative of engaging in drug transaction;
x furtive movements;
x actions indicative of engaging in violent crimes;
x wearing clothes/disguises commonly used in commission of crime;
x other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and
x proximity to a high crime area.32
Many of these categories are undoubtedly vague and call for the officer to 
make subjective judgments in exercising his or her discretion.  The evidence at the 
Floyd trial revealed that the most common bases for stops provided by the officers 
ZKR FRPSOHWHG WKH IRUPVZHUH ³+LJK&ULPH$UHD´ DQG ³)XUWLYH0RYHPHQWV´33
The former is always problematic.  Is a person wearing baggy clothes who has a 

31 Id. at 558.
32 See id. at 667±68 app. A.
33 Id. at 574.
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suspicious bulge in his waist more likely to be engaged in criminal activity if he is 
walking in the Bronx or walking in Westchester County?  The difference, of 
course, is that the Bronx has a very large African-American population and 
Westchester County is predominantly white.34 It is not hard to conclude that the 
unspoken factor leading to a stop of someone in baggy pants with a bulge at his 
waist is the race of the suspect, not the fact of his walking in a high crime area.
7KH ODWWHU IDFWRU LV HTXDOO\ SUREOHPDWLF 7KH SKUDVH ³IXUWLYHPRYHPHQW´ LV
remarkably subjective and vague.  What is a furtive movement may well differ 
when the person making the movement is a member of a suspected group²such as 
young African-American males.
As Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit stated in a related context: 
³:KHWKHU\RXVWDQGVWLOORUPRYHGULYHDERYH, below, or at the speed limit, you 
will be described by the police as acting suspiciously should they wish to stop or 
arrest you.  Such subjective, promiscuous appeals to an ineffable intuition should 
QRWEHFUHGLWHG´35 Two other examples noted in the Floyd opinion make the same 
point.  President Obama had this to say in a speech he gave on July 19, 2013, after 
the shooting of Trayvon Martin: 
There are very few African-$PHULFDQPHQ LQ WKLVFRXQWU\ZKRKDYHQ¶W
had the experience of being followed when they were shopping in a 
department store.  That includes me.  There are very few 
African-$PHULFDQ PHQ ZKR KDYHQ¶W KDG WKH H[SHULHQFH RI ZDONLQJ
across the street and hearing the locks click on the doors of cars.  That 
happens to me, at least before I was a senator.  There are very few 
African-$PHULFDQV ZKR KDYHQ¶W KDG WKH H[SHULHQFH RI JHWWLQJ RQ DQ
elevator and a woman clutching her purse nervously and holding her 
breath until she had a chance to get off.  That happens often.36
Similarly, in a July 16, 2013 New York Times op-ed following the Trayvon 
Martin shooting, Professor Ekow Yankah of Cardozo Law School wrote: 
What is reasonable to do, especially in the dark of night, is defined by 
preconceived social roles that paint young black men as potential 
criminals and predators.  Black men, the narrative dictates, are 

34 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES OF BRONX COUNTY, NEW YORK &
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, NEW YORK, (July 1, 2016), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/
bronxcountybronxboroughnewyork,westchestercountynewyork/PST045216 [https://perma.cc/6RPY-
MLBV].
35 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 556 (quoting United States v. Broomfield, 417 F.3d 654, 655 (7th 
Cir. 2005)).
36 See id. at 587 (quoting President Barack Obama, White House James S. Brady Press 
Briefing Room, Remarks by the President on Trayvon Martin (July 19, 2013), https://obamawhite
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/19/remarks-president-trayvon-martin [https://perma.cc/5
DKA-BFLW]).
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dangerous, to be watched and put down at the first false move.  This pain 
is one all black men know; putting away the tie you wear to the office 
means peeling off the assumption that you are owed equal respect.  Mr. 
0DUWLQ¶VKRRGLHVWUXFNWKHGHHSHVWFKRUGEHFDXVHZHNQRZWKDWGDULQJWR
wear jeans and a hooded sweatshirt too often means that the police or 
other citizens are judged to be reasonable in fearing you.37
The evidence that emerged in the Floyd trial substantiated and reinforced 
these intuitive and anecdotal comments.  For example, two officers at the Floyd 
WULDOWHVWLILHGWRWKHLUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHWHUP³IXUWLYHPRYHPHQWV´38
2QH>RIILFHU@H[SODLQHGWKDW³IXUWLYHPRYHPHQWLVDYHU\EURDGFRQFHSW´
DQGFRXOG LQFOXGHDSHUVRQ    ³ZDONLQJ LQDFHUWDLQZD\´³>D@FWLQJD




DW WKHLU ZDLVW´ ³JHWWLQJ D OLWWOH QHUYRXV PD\EH VKDNLQJ´ DQG




of a sudden becom[ing] ver\QHUYRXVYHU\DZDUH´39
A number of the other categories on the UF-250 are equally vague.  In many 
suppression hearings that I handled over the years, the question of what constitutes 
D³VXVSLFLRXVEXOJH´ZDVKRWO\OLWLJDWHG$ZDOOHWLQDIURQWRUEDFN pants pocket 
causes a bulge.  If the wearer of the pants is a white male over fifty, I doubt that 
any cop would give it a second thought.  But if the bulge is seen in the pants worn 
by a young African-American male, this may well become the basis for a stop.  
Other examples I have heard or seen include wearing baggy clothing, walking with 
a particular gait, walking in a group, walking into and out of a building, walking 
late at night, or driving a particular type of car.  The notion that police view these 
activities as intrinsically suspicious, without factoring in the race of the suspect, 
strains credulity.
The evidence at the Floyd trial also revealed how the interplay of race and 
reasonable suspicion became a driving force in departmental policy that 

37 Id. at 587±88 (quoting Ekow N. Yankah, Opinion, The Truth About Trayvon, N.Y. TIMES
(July 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/opinion/the-truth-about-trayvon.html [https://
perma.cc/LG6Q-VWPD]; Ekow N. Yankah, CARDOZO LAW, https://cardozo.yu.edu/directory/ekow-n-
yankah [https://perma.cc/B8GR-RSZ4].
38 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 561.
39 Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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institutionalized the practice of abusing the license to stop and frisk.40 Over the 
years, the NYPD continually pressured officers to increase the number of stops 
they made on the theory that an increase in stops would lead to a decrease in 
crime.41 This pressure translated to the precinct level in terms of productivity 
quotas²more stops led to more pay and promotions.42 Those with a low number 
of stops were viewed as shirking.43 This caused precinct commanders to 
HQFRXUDJH RIILFHUV WR VWRS ³WKH ULJKW SHRSOH [at] the right time, [in] the right 
ORFDWLRQ´44²which also served to encourage racially biased policing.
Other institutional failures included ignoring departmental statistics that 
demonstrated a racial bias in stop patterns; a failure to discipline officers engaging 
in racially biased policing; and a failure to review training materials to ensure that 
they were race neutral.  Additionally, the evidence revealed a failure of oversight 
over how stops were conducted and recorded²the documentation of stops was 
often sloppy and rarely reviewed by any supervisor.  And patterns in the recorded 
bases for stops²such as furtive movements or high crime areas²were accepted 
without question.  Finally, there is at least anecdotal evidence that many stops were 
made in which the officer failed to make any written record explaining the 
justification for the stop.45
Other evidence during the Floyd trial included surreptitious recordings of 
police talk within certain precincts, which demonstrated the contempt and hostility 
of supervisors toward the local population.  For example, at a roll call on 
November 8, 2008, at a precinct in Bedford Stuyvesant in Brooklyn²an 
overwhelmingly black neighborhood²a lieutenant stated:
>:@H¶YHJRWWRNHHSWKHFRUQHUFOHDU%HFDXVHLI\RXget too big of a 
FURZG WKHUH \RX NQRZ    WKH\¶UH JRLQJ WR WKLQN WKDW WKH\ RZQ WKH
EORFN :HRZQWKHEORFN 7KH\GRQ¶WRZQWKHEORFNDOO ULJKW" 7KH\
might live there but we own the block.  All right?  We own the streets 
here.  You tell them what to do.46
$W DQRWKHU UROO FDOO WKH VDPH OLHXWHQDQW VWDWHG WKDW WKH RIILFHUV DUH ³QRW
working in Midtown Manhattan where people are walking around smiling and 
KDSS\<RX¶UHZRUNLQJLQ%HG-6WX\ZKHUHHYHU\RQH¶VSUREDEO\JRWDZDUUDQW´47





44 Id. at 604 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
45 Id. at 608±09, 611±13, 616±17.
46 Id. at 597 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
47 Id. (citation omitted).
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It is amazing how this TXRWHSUHVDJHGWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VUHFHQWRSLQLRQLQ
Utah v. Streiff,48 where the Court held that if a person was stopped without 
reasonable suspicion but turned out to have an open warrant, then any fruits of that 
unconstitutional stop would not be suppressed.49 As pointed out by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor in her passionate dissent, approximately 7.8 million people in the 
United States have an open warrant²mostly for minor offenses such as traffic 
violations or unpaid fines.50 In Ferguson, Missouri, 16,000 of the 21,000 residents 
have open warrants and St. Louis officers routinely stop people solely to check 
whether they may have an outstanding warrant.51 Justice Sotomayor noted that 
over a four year period in Newark, New Jersey, officers stopped 52,235 
pedestrians and ran warrant checks on 39,308 of them.52 A Justice Department 
analysis revealed that 93% of the Newark stops were not supported by reasonable 
suspicion.53
In a recent op-HG SLHFH E\ D IRUPHU %DOWLPRUH SROLFH RIILFHU WLWOHG ³:KHQ
Police Are Poor RoOH0RGHOV´ WKH DXWKRU WROG RI DQ LQFLGHQWZKHUH D ³VHUJHDQW
saw a group of young black men on a street corner and told an officer to order 
WKHPWROHDYH7KHRIILFHUVDLGKHKDGQRUHDVRQWRGRVRµ0DNHVRPHWKLQJXS¶
WKHVHUJHDQWUHSOLHG´54 On another occasion, when the author told a detective that 
KHKDGPDGHDEDGVHDUFKDVHUJHDQWVDLG³:HGRQ¶WFDUHDERXWZKDWKDSSHQVLQ
FRXUW  :H MXVW FDUH DERXW JHWWLQJ WKH DUUHVW´55 He ended his article with the 
IROORZLQJZRUGV³ZLWKWKHULJKW OHDGHUVKLSDQd training, and if the good officers 
stay, the department can uproot the attitudes and practices that have poisoned its 
relationship with the black people of Baltimore and begin an era where the police 
ZLOOEHUROHPRGHOVIRUWKHFLW\DQGRQHDQRWKHU´56
The testimony at the Floyd trial again confirmed these observations.  NYPD 
officers accepted the notion that they could rely on hunches about criminality 
(often having an implicit racial bias) without being required to provide any 
credible explanation for their alleged reasonable suspicion of criminality.  The trial 
record demonstrated that the highest leadership in the department condoned this 
way of thinking and certainly did nothing to stop it.  With respect to identifying 
whom to stop, Chief Joseph Esposito, the highest ranking uniformed member of 
WKH1<3'WHVWLILHGDVIROORZV³>6WRSVDUH@EDVHGRQWKHWRWDOLW\RIRND\ZKRLV

48 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
49 Id. at 2062±63.
50 See id. at 2068 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
51 Id. (citation omitted).
52 Id. (citation omitted).
53 Id. at 2068±69 (citation omitted).
54 Joseph Crystal, Opinion, When Police Are Poor Role Models for One Another, N.Y. TIMES
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
committing the²who is getting shot in a certain area . . .  Well who is doing those 
shootings?  Well, it’s young men of color in their late teens, early 20s´57 A deputy 
inspector was captured on a clandestine tape recording of a roll call making a 
QHDUO\LGHQWLFDOVWDWHPHQW³7KLVLVDERXWVWRSSLQJWKHULJKWSHRSOHWKHULJKWSODFH
the right location. . . .  The problem was, what, male blacks. . . .  [A]nd I have no 
SUREOHP WHOOLQJ \RX WKLV PDOH EODFNV  WR  ´58 In fact, the then-Police 
Commissioner, Ray Kelly, allegedly said at a meeting that the NYPD focused on 
VWRSSLQJ\RXQJEODFNV DQG+LVSDQLFV ³EHFDXVHKHZDQWHG WR LQstill fear in them, 
HYHU\WLPHWKH\OHDYHWKHLUKRPHWKH\FRXOGEHVWRSSHGE\WKHSROLFH´59
What this section demonstrates is that the basis for police stops of pedestrians 
or motorists is a highly subjective judgement on the part of a law enforcement 
officer that he or she has a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot.  As the 
testimony at the Floyd trial showed, the reasonable belief is often not based on 
articulable reasonable suspicion, but rather on instincts based on implicit biases 
that are rampant in both police departments and our society at large.  At the end of 
the day, the notion that the huge number of stops was justified in the name of 
fighting crime and efficient policing encouraged officers to rely on implicit biases 
in their daily policing activity.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW, FACT FINDING AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION²           
A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS
Judges are subject to many of the same biases as others in our society, but 
they have an additional problem.  When a defense lawyer moves to suppress 
evidence because she believes that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop 
her client, she must make the difficult decision of whether to allow the defendant 
to testify at the resulting suppression hearing.  If the defendant testifies, it is his 
word against the word of all the police officers involved in making the stop.  Often 
the defendant has a criminal record and surely has a strong motive to testify 
falsely, as a conviction will likely mean a jail sentence.  The judge, who is tasked 
with reviewing the facts surrounding the stop through the lens of hindsight, is in a 
very difficult position.  Because the sole issue at the hearing is who is telling the 
truth, the judge must find one witness credible and the other not.  In plain English, 
this means that the judge believes that either the defendant or the officer is a liar.  
It is not easy for a judge to find that the officer is a liar.  Judges are human and it is 
unpleasant, to say the least, to suffer the public attack that often follows when a 

57 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 603±04 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted).
58 Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
59 Id. at 606 (citation omitted).
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judge finds that a police officer has lied and believes²on the flip side²that a 
criminal has told the truth.60
It is therefore not surprising that most suppression motions are denied.  
During the Floyd trial, the City of New York²the defendant in the trial²released 
a study purporting to show that I had granted more suppression motions than other 
judges in the Southern District of New York.61 Of course the study was flawed as 
it was based solely on a review of written decisions²as opposed to decisions 
delivered orally from the bench.62 I believe that most judges will avoid issuing a 
ZULWWHQRSLQLRQILQGLQJDQRIILFHU¶VWHVWLPRQ\QRWWREHFUHGLEOH%XWWKHUHDOSRLQW
is that the flawed study was issued in the middle of the Floyd trial to make the case 
that I was biased against the police because I suppressed evidence in a very small 
percentage of cases.  The obvious purpose was to intimidate me and to condition 
the public to the notion that because I had suppressed evidence in several criminal 
cDVHV,ZDVQRWD³IDLU´MXGJH
The good news, however, is that with the advent of cellphone cameras and 
body cameras, suppression hearings may no longer be a credibility contest.  In a 
number of recent suppression hearings, a defense lawyer has been able to obtain 
police videos or citizen videos that have demonstrated that the police version of the 
stop is simply false.63 This incontrovertible proof may be a real game changer in 
the judicial review of events where the eyewitnesses have traditionally been only 
the defendant and the police.  When a judge is able to review the event in real 
time²as if she were there at the time of the stop²she can make her own informed 
decision as to whether there was a basis for a police stop that can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.
It is important to note that a judge has enormous discretion in finding facts.  
Such findings are virtually unreviewable and the judge knows this.  It is the judge 
who sees and evaluates the witnesses.  Her findings of fact are reviewed on appeal
for abuse of discretion, which is almost never found by a reviewing court.  
Appellate judges are reviewing a cold record²they neither saw nor heard the 
witnesses.  My point is that judges, like police officers, have wide discretion in 
assessing whether a police stop was proper, i.e. based on articulable reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

60 See, e.g., United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 921 F. 
Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
61 See Christopher Dunn, Suppression Rulings and Views of the Police, N.Y. L.J. (June 6, 
2013).
62 See id.
63 See Steve Schmadeke, 5 Cops Caught in Lies on Witness Stand, Judge Says, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 15, 2014), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-04-15/news/ct-police-testimony-lies-met-
20140415_1_police-officers-five-officers-chicago-police [https://perma.cc/3RUF-YH4J]; Martha 
Neil, Feds Drop Gun Case and Judge Blasts Police After Security Camera Contradicts Officers’ 
Testimony, A.B.A. J. (May 16, 2016, 1:23 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/feds_drop_
gun_case_after_video_contradicts_police_testimony_judge_blasts [https://perma.cc/JK79-LDVQ].
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But unlike a police officer, the judge does not need to make a split-second 
decision on the street.  The judge is a detached actor, with the luxury of time to 
weigh all of the circumstances.  In that sense, the judge is both advantaged and 
disadvantaged.  She can consider the facts from the safety of her perch on the 
bench, but she was not present as the events unfolded.  She cannot know if the 
defendant looked cocky, threatening, or afraid, or whether the cop made a blatantly 
racist remark which escalated the encounter.  In the absence of a contemporaneous 
recording, the judge is in a tough spot.
The next question, then, is whether Terry has set the right standard.  Is it too 
vague and subject to the personal biases of the officer and then the judge?  Should 
there be a brighter line test?  Should the Court have adhered to the probable cause 
standard of the Fourth Amendment, and would we all be better off if the elastic 
standard that has been in use for close to fifty years were somehow more definite 
and less subjective?  I am not enamored of the Terry decision, a view that is shared 
by many scholars and commentators.64 But the question is always what should
replace it?
V. IMPACT ON THE COMMUNITY
The fruits of the elastic Terry standard have been devastating to minority 
communities throughout the United States.  In the recent DOJ report on the failures 
of the Baltimore Police Department,65 the practice of indiscriminate police stops 
was roundly criticized for creating a legacy of discriminatory law enforcement in 
which black people are disproportionately stopped and searched without cause.66
The report noted that from January 2010 to May 2015, 300,000 street stops were 
made in Baltimore in predominantly black neighborhoods, without reasonable 
suspicion.67 Four hundred ten people were stopped at least 10 times each from 

64 See, e.g., E. Martin Estrada, Criminalizing Silence: Hiibel and the Continuing Expansion of 
the Terry Doctrine, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. ³>,@WLVFOHDUWKDWWKHUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQ
standard lends itself to broad applicability. What we are left with, then, is a haphazard, yet one-
directional, broadening of police authority during a Terry VWRS´ 6FRWW ( 6XQGE\ A Return to 
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 
³,Qstead of carving out a narrow exception to probable cause, reasonable suspicion became a 
valid compromise standard that comports with the [F]ourth [A]mendment if the Court decides that, 
after balancing the interests, it is reasonable.  The government no longer argues against a presumed 
starting point of probable cause but rather argues for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable 
accommodation of competing interests.  Probable cause becomes merely one point on a continuum of 
UHDVRQDEOHQHVV´6FRWW(6XQGE\An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar 
and Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN¶S L. REV    ³$ EURDGO\ GHILQHG UHDVRQDEOHQHVV
EDODQFLQJWHVWODUJHO\SODFHVWKHFLWL]HQ¶V)RXUWK$PHQGPHQWIDWHLQWKHKDQGVRIRWKHUV´
65 CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP¶T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE 
DEPARTMENT 5±6 (2016).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 5.
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2010 to 2015.68 Ninety-five percent of those people were African-American.69
One black man was stopped thirty times in less than four years, although he was 
never charged.70 The problem with the policy, in part, was that it stressed the 
quantity of stops over the quality.  In Baltimore, 82% of all vehicle stops were of 
African-Americans, although they made up only 27% of the driving-age 
population in the greater metropolitan area.71
Similarly, the DOJ Report that investigated the police department of 
Ferguson, Missouri, showed a distinct racial bias and the impact of biased policing 
on the black citizens of Ferguson.72 The report concludes that some offenses were 
almost exclusively charged against African-Americans.73 ³)RU H[DPSOH IURP
2011 to 2013, African-Americans accounted for 95% of Manner of Walking in 
Roadway charges, and 94% of Failure to &RPSO\FKDUJHV´74 Black drivers were 
more than twice as likely to be searched after being stopped than white drivers.75
Interestingly, contraband was found 26% less frequently with black drivers than 
with white drivers.76 And 90% of the documented use of force by the police in 
Ferguson was used against African-Americans.77 Furthermore, African-Americans 
DUH ³PRUH OLNHO\ WR UHFHLYHPXOWLSOH FLWDWLRQV GXULQJ D VLQJOH LQFLGHQW´ DQG ³DUH
68% less likely than others to have their cases dismissed by the [m]unicipal 
>M@XGJH´78 ,Q  DORQH ³$IULFDQ-Americans accounted for 92% of cases in 
ZKLFKDQDUUHVWZDUUDQWZDV LVVXHG´79 In addition to the Manner of Walking in 
Roadway charges and Failure to Comply charges, African-Americans account for 
³RIDOO5HVLVWLng Arrest charges; 92% of all Peace Disturbance charges; and 
 RI )DLOXUH WR 2EH\ FKDUJHV´80 A report written by the Vera Institute for 
Justice showed that because of the large number of police stops of young African-
American males, the community is very distrustful of the police and often refuses 
to cooperate with them in any way.81 Even if a person has observed a crime, he 

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78 Id. at 63.
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will not report it to the police or will refuse to assist in an investigation.  The 
distrust sown by years of unwarranted police stops has alienated the community.  
This is a bad result for both the police and the community.
The other consequence of the overuse of Terry stops is that too many young 
African-American males end up with an arrest record, although not necessarily a 
conviction.  But this means that they have been fingerprinted, they may have spent 
a night in jail, and they may have been held in prison unnecessarily because they 
were unable to raise bail.  Today, this may also mean that the person wrongfully 
stopped may be quickly deported if he is found to be an undocumented alien, even 
if he is only arrested.  The fact that the charges are often dismissed is of little 
comfort to those who have had this experience.  Even when the stop does result in 
the seizure of contraband²usually very small amounts of marijuana²this just 
means that more African-Americans and Hispanics²the usual targets of these 
stops²end up with criminal records for very minor crimes.  This over-
criminalization effect has had a devastating effect on minority communities.
VI. A BETTER MODEL AND A BETTER FUTURE
Many police departments have moved away from the use of the stop and frisk 
model, as defined by Terry, and are now experimenting with different methods of 
policing that may be more effective and may improve police-community relations.  
These include community policing, hotspot policing, focused deterrence, problem-
solving policing, and use of predictive algorithms.  It is for other contributors to 
this symposium issue to describe in more detail the new forms of policing and to 
assess whether they are successful.  Suffice it to say from my point of view as the 
trial judge in the Floyd case that the move away from stop and frisk is most 
welcome.  I am hopeful that, unless the new President and new Attorney General 
move policing backward, we are on the way to a better system of law enforcement 
that will both reduce crime and improve community relations.  And best of all, it is 
my hope that the new order will bring much needed fairness to the criminal justice 
system as a whole.
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81 JENNIFER FRATELLO ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, COMING OF AGE WITH STOP AND FRISK:
EXPERIENCES, PERCEPTIONS, AND PUBLIC SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 42, 48±49 (2013), http://archive.vera.
org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/stop-and-frisk_technical-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TD
C-XXSZ]. 
